In decision under risk participants' choices are based on probability values systematically different from those that are objectively correct. Similar systematic distortions are found in tasks involving relative frequency judgments. These distortions limit performance in a wide variety of tasks and an evident question is, why do we systematically fail in our use of probability and relative frequency information? We propose a Bounded Log-Odds Model (BLO) of probability and relative frequency distortion based on three assumptions. The key assumption is that the dynamic range of representation of probability and relative frequency is limited. We tested the model experimentally and found that BLO accounts for individual participants' data better than all previous models in the literature. We also show that subject to the dynamic range limitation, participants' choice of distortion serves to maximize the mutual information between objective and internal values, a form of bounded rationality.
In making decisions, we choose among actions whose outcomes are typically uncertain; we can model such choices as choices among lotteries. To specify a lottery we list all of its possible outcomes and the corresponding probabilities of occurrence that a specific lottery assigns to each outcome. If we knew all the relevant probabilities, we would be engaged in decision under risk 1 . If we can also assign a numerical measure of utility to each outcome , we could assign an expected utility to each lottery, ,
and a decision maker maximizing expected utility 2, 3 would select the lottery with the highest expected utility among those offered. The probabilities serve to weight the contribution of the utility of each outcome. The Expected Utility Theory (EUT) model is simple, but has a wide range of applications, not just in economic decisions but also in perception 4, 5 and planning of movement 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 .
For more than two centuries EUT was treated as an adequate description of human choice behavior in decision under risk until challenged by Allais 11 . In an elegant series of experiments he showed that human decision makers did not weight utilities by the corresponding probabilities of occurrence in choosing among lotteries. In Prospect Theory, Kahneman and Tversky 12 resolved the Allais paradoxes and other shortcomings of EUT by assuming that decision makers use a transformation of probability -a probability weight or decision weight-in place of probability in the computation of expected utility. The distortion function in decision under risk was originally inferred from human choices in experiments and it is often-but not always-an inverted-S-shaped function of 13, 14, 15 .
Wu, Delgado, and Maloney 16 compared performance in a "classical" decision under risk task with performance in a mathematically equivalent motor decision task. Each L O 1 ,...,O n p 1 ,!,p n
participant completed both tasks and while the fitted probability distortion functions for the classical task were-as expected-inverted-S-shaped, those based on the motor task tended to be better fit by S-shaped functions. The same participant could have both the inverted-Sshaped and S-shaped forms of the distortion function in different decision tasks.
Ungemach, Stewart and Chater 17 found a similar tendency to underweight small probabilities in decisions and overweight large 18, 19, 20 . Probability distortion in the form of inverted-S-shaped and S-shaped weighting functions is also found in monkeys' choice behavior 21 and is supported by human neuroimaging evidence 22, 23 .
Zhang and Maloney 24 reported that both the inverted-S-shaped or S-shaped distortion functions are found in relative frequency and confidence tasks other than decision-making under risk. For convenience, we will use the term "probability" to include relative frequency and confidence. The same participants had different inverted-S-shaped or S-shaped probability distortion functions in different experimental conditions even though the trials for the different conditions were randomly interleaved. They concluded that the probability distortion function is not fixed for a participant but dynamic, changing systematically with task.
There is increasing evidence that dynamic remapping of representational range occurs along more abstract dimensions, such as value 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 , numerosity 30, 31 , relative frequency 32 , and variance 33 .
Zhang and Maloney 24 found that probability distortions could be well fit by linear transformations:
,
where is the log-odds 34 or logit function 35 and and are free parameters. See Figure 1a for examples and Zhang and Maloney 24 for further examples, which include 20 datasets taken from 12 studies involving probability, relative frequency and
confidence, all the studies for which we could recover and analyze data. We caution that these Linear in Log-Odds (LLO) fits to data represent empirical regularities unmotivated by any theory. Over the course of this article we will replace Eq. 2 by a new model, Bounded Log-Odds (BLO) based on theoretical considerations. We propose that probability distortion in both decision under risk and in judgment of relative frequency is fundamentally a consequence of a specific limitation on the dynamic range of the neural representation of probability which we identify. As a consequence of this limitation, human performance in a wide variety of tasks
However, the variation of probability distortion with task hints that-subject to "bounds" on probability representation-individuals might adaptively select the specific form of probability distortion that allows them to perform as well as possible in the task, a form of bounded rationality in Herbert Simon's sense 36 . What counts as "as well as possible" varies with task and for the tasks considered here we will identify the appropriate decision variables.
BLO is based on three assumptions:
log-odds representation

representation on a bounded Thurstone scale
variance compensation
We will use factorial model comparison 37 to separately test each of the three assumptions against plausible alternatives including LLO. We will then compare the performance of BLO to all previous models of decision under risk currently in the literature. The data used in all model comparisons are taken from a new experiment we report here and data from a previous article by Gonzalez and Wu 14 . Last, we will separately test the Maximum Mutual Information hypothesis that BLO serves to maximize the mutual Shannon information between objective decision variables and their internal representation, a form of bounded rationality. 
Results
Assumptions of BLO
a one-to-one, increasing transformation of probability. A similar log-odds scale has been introduced by Erev and colleagues 38, 39 to explain the probability distortion in confidence ratings. Such noise-perturbed psychological scales date back to Thurstone 40 .
Assumption 2: representation on a bounded Thurstone scale.
Thurstone 40 proposed several alternative models for representing subjective scales and methods for fitting a wide variety of data to such models. We are not concerned with methods for fitting data to Thurstone scales or their use in constructing attitude scales; we are only interested in Thurstone scales as convenient mathematical structures. We can think of the bounded Thurstone scale 40 as an imperfect neural device capable of storing magnitudes within a fixed range. We can encode a magnitude signal anywhere in this range and later retrieve it. The retrieved value , however, is perturbed by Gaussian noise with mean 0 and variance : we might store 0.5 and retrieve 0.63 or 0.48. The schematic Gaussian distributions in Figure 1b capture this representational uncertainty. For simplicity we assume that Gaussian error is independent, identically-distributed across the scale (Thurstone's Case V).
We can pick any interval on the log-odds scale and map it linearly to the Thurstone device. In Figure 1b we illustrate two choices. One represents a small range of the log-odds The greater the log-odds range that needs to be encoded, the greater the density of the magnitudes along the Thurstone scale, and the greater the chances of confusion of nearby codes and vice versa. The challenge is to choose a transformation that is most beneficial to the organism.
Our concern is with the representation of probability, specifically in the form of logodds. In mathematical notation we select an interval on the log-odds scale to be mapped to the full range of the Thurstone scale and in effect we confine the representation of log-odds to this interval:
.
The value will be mapped to the minimum on the Thurstone scale, the value to the maximum. The smaller the half-range the smaller the uncertainty of the encoded and decoded values ( Figure 1b ) relative to the log-odds scale. We refer to as "truncated log-odds".
Assumption 3: variance compensation.
Besides the random error on the representational scale, there could be an additional uncertainty (variance) associated with the encoding of probability as when estimates of probability are used in place of exact probabilities (see Supplements S1 & S2). Less reliable estimates are in effect allotted less space on the representational scale. 
where is, as before, truncated log-odds, is a measure of the reliability of probability that can vary with , and the scaling factor adjusts the bounded interval to the fixed Thurstone scale. This transformation is an example of efficient encoding: the transformation maximizes the information encoded by the scale. There is experimental evidence for variance compensation analogous to efficient coding in perception 41, 42, 43, 44 and its recent applications to value and probability 27, 29, 45 . See especially the review by Simoncelli and Olshausen 43 . The key idea is that a more precise coding of one stimulus at one point in a scale may come at the cost of a coarser coding of another stimulus at another point.
Overview of the experimental tests of BLO
To test BLO, we first performed a new experiment where each participant completed both a decision-making under risk (DMR) task and a judgment of relative frequency (JRF) tasks. We also re-analyzed the data of Gonzalez and Wu's 14 DMR experiment. Objective probabilities in these two representative tasks can be readily manipulated and subjective probabilities precisely estimated.
In Gonzalez and Wu 14 , 10 participants were tested on 165 two-outcome lotteries, a factorial combination of 15 value sets by 11 probabilities (see Methods). Participants chose between lotteries and sure rewards so that their certainty equivalent (CE)-the value of sure reward that is equally preferred-to each lottery was measured. We refer to Gonzalez and
Wu's 14 dataset as GW99, the set of lotteries included in which is large and rich enough to allow for reliable modeling on the individual level-as demonstrated in Gonzalez and Wu 14 .
The decision variables for such a task are the certainty equivalents. To the extent that the participant can correctly order certainty equivalents, she can maximize expected utility.
We refer to the new experiment as Experiment JD (see Methods). In the experiment, each of 75 participants completed a DMR task whose procedure and design ( Figure S1a) followed that of Gonzalez and Wu (1999) as well as a JRF task ( Figure S1b) where participants reported the relative frequency of black or white dots among an array of black and white dots. The same 11 probabilities were used in the two tasks. The decision variables for such a task are the relative frequencies themselves.
By comparing the performance of individuals in two different tasks that involved the same set of probabilities, we hoped to identify the possible common representation of probability and how it may vary with task.
Based on the measured CEs (for DMR) or estimated relative frequencies (for JRF), we performed a non-parametric estimate and model fits for the probability distortion of each participant and each task (see Methods). Similar to previous studies of DMR 14 and JRF 24, 46 , we found inverted-S-shaped probability distortions for most participants but also marked individual differences in both tasks ( Figure 2abc ). The DMR results of GW99 ( Figure 2a ) and Experiment JD (Figure 2b ) were similar and were collapsed in further analysis whenever possible.
We used the non-parametric estimates to assess participants' probability distortions and we compared model fits with them. For an average participant (the last panels in Figure   2abc ), the LLO and BLO models provided almost equally good fits. However, an examination of individual participants' probability distortions revealed that, compared to the LLO fit, the BLO fit captured observed individual differences considerably better. This observation can be quantified using the mean absolute deviations of the model fits from the non-parametric estimates (Figure 2de ), which was significantly smaller for BLO than for LLO at for p = 0.25 2.87, p < 0.006).
Figure 2. Comparison of model fits to non-parametric estimates of probability distortions. a. Reanalysis of DMR data from Wu & Gonzalez (1999).
In the first 10 panels the data for π p ( ) each participant is plotted versus as black circles. The LLO fit to the participant's data is drawn as a blue contour, the BLO fit as a red contour. The last panel is the mean across participants. b. DMR data from our experiment. The format is identical with data and model fits for 75 participants. The last panel is the mean across participants. c. JRF data from our experiment.
For each of the 75 participants we plot the residuals versus to illustrate the small but patterned probability distortions found. We also plot the fits of LLO (blue) and BLO (red) to the residuals. Corresponding panels in b and c are for the same participant. Compared to the LLO fits (blue curves), the BLO fits (red curves) were overall in better agreement with the non-parametric estimates of probability distortions. d. e. Mean absolute deviations of the model fits from the nonparametric estimates are plotted against , separately for DMR (d) and JRF (e). Shadings denote SE.
Factorial model comparisons
BLO is built on three assumptions: log-odds representation, boundedness, and variance compensation. To test these assumptions, we used factorial model comparison 37 and constructed 12 models whose assumptions differ in the following three "dimensions" (see For each participant, we fit each of the 12 models to the participant's CEs (for DMR) or estimated relative frequencies (for JRF) using maximum likelihood estimation (see
Supplement S3 for details). The Akaike information criterion with a correction for sample sizes, AICc 56, 57 , was used for model selection. For a specific model, the Δ AICc was computed for each participant and each task as the difference of AICc between the model and the minimum AICc among the 12 models. A higher value of ΔAICc indicates a worse model fit.
For both DMR and JRF, BLO was the model of the lowest summed ΔAICc across participants ( Figure 3ab ). The results were similar for participants in different experiments ( Figure S3 ). To see how well each of BLO's assumptions behaves compared to its alternatives, we divided the 12 models into model families by their assumptions on D1, D2, or D3 (e.g. the bounded family and the bounds-free family). We first calculated for each model the number of participants best fit by the model (lowest Δ AICc) and the exceedance probability from the group-level Bayesian model selection 58 , which is an omnibus measure of the probability that the model is the best model among the 12 models. The summed number of best-fit participants is then plotted for each model family in Figure 3cd . For both DMR and JRF, the assumptions of BLO outperformed the alternative assumptions on each of the three dimensions, with the summed exceedance probability approaching 1.
We also performed model comparisons separately for participants with inverted Sshaped and participants with S-shaped distortions ( Figure S4 ), and tested a range of additional models of decision under risk outside the framework of Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) we currently used ( Figure S5 ). Again, the BLO model outperformed all alternative models (see Supplement S4 for details). 
Invariances across time and tasks
The scaling parameter maps the bounded range of to the Thurstone scale of fixed length. An exploration of the estimated parameters of BLO (Supplement S5) shows that the product of and was indeed close to a constant across participants, whose median estimate was 2.03 for DMR and 3.89 for JRF ( Figure 4a ). We call the Thurstone invariant, the observed invariance of which suggests that the length of the Thurstone scale is similar for different individuals.
One might question whether the invariance of might be a consequence of model redundancy, that is, whether the apparent two parameters are effectively a single parameter and the variation observed is random. Instead, if Thurstone invariant is a personal signature, we should expect it to vary slightly from individual to individual but be positively correlated for the same individual across time and tasks.
Among the 75 participants of Experiment JD, 51 participants completed two sessions on two different days, which allowed us to evaluate the consistency of Thurstone invariant across time. As expected, we found significant positive correlation between Session 1's and Session 2's ( Figure S6 ) for both DMR (rs = 0.57, one-tailed P < 0.001) and JRF (rs = 0.80, one-tailed P < 0.001).
We also found a modest but significant positive correlation between a participant's in JRF and the participant's in DMR ( Figure 4b ): rs = 0.21, one-tailed P = 0.039. Given that the two tasks involve entirely different responses and processing of probability information, such across-task correlation is surprising and suggests a common constraint underlying the probability representations in different tasks. This constraint is probably tighter in tasks that
demand more working memory, corresponding to a smaller for DMR (when value as well as probability needs to be represented) than that for JRF. 
Maximizing mutual information
Participants had a bounded log-odds representation that corresponds to a probability range far narrower than the range of objective probabilities ( ). As we will see below, this choice of conforms with the Maximum Mutual Information hypothesis. 
For our purposes, the efficiency of coding can be quantified by the mutual information between stimuli and responses : ,
where denotes the probability of occurrence of a specific stimulus , denotes the probability of occurrence of a specific response , and denotes the conjoint probability of the co-occurrence of the two. Stimuli and responses refer to objective and subjective relative frequencies in JRF and refer to expected values and certainty equivalents in DMR. For a specific task and BLO parameters, we could use the BLO model to generate simulated responses and computed expected mutual information using a Monte Carlo method (see Methods).
For a virtual participant endowed with median parameters, we evaluated how the expected mutual information in DMR or JRF varied with and , given the invariance of . We found that the expected mutual information varied non-monotonically with the values of and ( Figure 5a ) and there is evidently a unique maximum over the range considered. For both DMR and JRF, the observed median values of and (marked by solid red circles) were close to the values maximizing the expected mutual information: the mutual information associated with the observed and were lower than maximum only by 0.14% for DMR and 0.53% for JRF. In contrast, if no bounds had been imposed on the probability range of (i.e. , ), the mutual information would be 6.23% and 14.1% lower than maximum, respectively for DMR and JRF.
The observed and of individual participants were highly symmetric around 0 (i.e. symmetric around 0.5 on the probability scale) in the JRF task but more variant in the DMR task. As Figure 5b shows, this difference may also be driven by mutual information
maximization: To achieve no less than 95% of maximum mutual information, and could tolerate a much larger deviation from symmetry in DMR than in JRF. 
We further computed the maximum mutual information for each participant based on the participant's BLO parameters, given that and are allowed to vary. The maximum mutual information was positively correlated with the observed mutual information for both DMR (rs = 0.94, one-tailed P < 0.001) and JRF (rs = 0.87, one-tailed P < 0.001), consistent with the mutual information maximization hypothesis (Figure 5c ). The diagonal lines in both plots of Figure 5c are bounds on possible performance and the data in both plots are clustered below them.
Individual participants' mutual information was positively correlated across time ( Figure   S7 , DMR: rs = 0.53, one-tailed P < 0.001; JRF: rs = 0.53, one-tailed P < 0.001) and across tasks (Figure 5d , rs = 0.33, one-tailed P = 0.002). Since there was little across-task correlation in noise variance (rs = 0.066, one-tailed P = 0.29), the across-task correlation in mutual information could not be due to correlated levels of response noises. Instead, it implies a common information processing capacity for different tasks.
Discussion
We presented a model (Bounded Log-Odds) of probability and relative frequency distortion and tested it experimentally in an experiment with two conditions. In one condition participants made judgments of relative frequency (JRF) and, in the other, decisions under risk (DMR).
Each participant completed both conditions, allowing us to compare performance in the two tasks within participant. We also reported a reanalysis of a data set from a DMR experiment carried out by Gonzalez and Wu 14 .
The BLO Model is intended to model performance in both tasks and it is the first model that attempts to do so. It is based on three assumptions: log-odds representation, boundedness, and variance compensation. We independently tested each of these assumptions using factorial model comparison to verify that they are all essential to fitting human data. If we replace any assumption by the alternatives we considered, the resulting model is strictly inferior to BLO. We then compared BLO with all of the other models in the literature intended to account for probability distortion. BLO outperformed all these models in accounting for our experimental results as well as the data of Gonzalez and Wu 14 .
We further show that human performance comes close to maximizing the mutual information between decision variables in a task and their imperfect internal representations.
The decision variables in the DMR task are certainty equivalents (CEs). To the extent that the participant can correctly order the distorted CEs, she will maximize expected value. The decision variables in the JRF task are the relative frequencies themselves.
In the four experiments we report, participants chose probability distortions consistent with BLO and also with maximizing mutual information. Two recent articles use the same criterion (maximum mutual information) to model human encoding of value 29 or to re-interpret the context effects of decision under risk 45 . These articles taken together are consistent with a claim, supported by considerable experimental data, that many observed failures in DMR can be viewed as attempts to compensate for immutable limits in cognitive processing in order to preserve Shannon information, a form of bounded rationality 36 .
There are many theoretical models intended to account for inverted-S-or S-shaped probability distortion: the power model of proportion judgment 59, 60 , the support theory model of probability judgment 61, 62 , the calibration model 63 , the stochastic model of confidence rating 38, 39 , and the adaptive probability theory model of decision under risk 64 . However, almost all these models were proposed for one specific type of task and are not intended as general explanations for observed distortion of probability and relative frequency. Neither do they explain why participants exhibit different probability distortions in different tasks and task conditions. There was even a belief, at least in decision under risk, that the parameters of distortion should be specific to each participant but constant across all tasks 65 .
In contrast, BLO models a common mechanism underlying all probability distortion, where we identified two constraints-boundedness and compensation for representational uncertainty (variance)-that are pervasive in models of cognitive and perceptual tasks 37, 44, 66, 67 . We found that BLO can be used to estimate an individual's probability distortion in one task and to some extent predict the same individual's performance in another task. BLO also accounts for variation in the "slope" of the distortion function with task or different settings of the same task. We next describe some of the implications of BLO.
Discontinuities at p = 0 and p = 1 BLO and any model based on the boundedness assumption predict that and , that is, probability distortion with discontinuities at and . Such discontinuities are also found in the neo-additive family of weighting functions 54 For the DMR task, where probability is explicitly defined and no explicit sampling process seems to be involved, we still found that the slope of probability distortion relies on a term, varying with . It is as if people are compensating for the variation of a virtual sampling process 69 , or for the variation caused by Gaussian noise on the Thurstonian logodds scale Supplement S1, see also 70 . Lebreton et al. 70 show that a generalized form of is correlated with the confidence of value or probability perception and is automatically encoded in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) of the human brain.
Under certain circumstances, such variance compensation may result in counterintuitive nonmonotonic probability distortion that is indeed empirically observed (see Supplement S6 ). 
The Thurstone invariant
Predicting the slope of probability distortion
The invariance of the Thurstone invariant implies that when the encoded range is narrower, the scaling parameter would be greater, leading to a greater slope of probability distortion. Meanwhile, mutual information maximization requires to scale with the range of probabilities in the stimuli. Thus BLO predicts that the narrower the probability range of the stimuli, the greater the slope of distortion.
We performed the following meta-analysis on previous DMR studies to test this prediction. Fox and Poldrack 71, Table A . 3 summarized the results of a number of decision-making studies that were modeled in the framework of Prospect Theory. In Fox and Poldrack's list, we identified the studies where the gamble set was explicitly defined and each gamble consisted of two outcomes that could be denoted (see Supplemental Table S3 for the 12 studies included). Though different functional forms-LLO, Prelec's 47 one-parameter and twoparameter functions, and Tversky and Kahneman's 13 weighting function-had been assumed in different studies, all had a parameter for the slope of probability distortion that is roughly
For each study, we computed the standard deviation of 's distribution as a measure of the probability range of stimuli. Consistent with the BLO prediction, we found this measure was significantly negatively correlated with the slope of probability distortion (Figure 6) , rs = -0.65, one-tailed P = 0.010. Each data point is for one published study. The red line denotes the regression line. The correlation is negative and significant. We describe the selection of studies in the text. See Table  S3 for a full list of the studies. That the slope of distortion decreases with the standard deviation of is consistent with the prediction of BLO.
The crossover point
A puzzle we did not address earlier concerns the crossover point of probability distortion (i.e. the point on the distortion curve where overestimation changes into underestimation or the reverse). It has been frequently observed that the crossover point is near 0.5 for the JRF task 24 but approximately 0.37 for the DMR task 47 . That is, the probability distortion is symmetric around 0.5 in the former but asymmetric in the latter. There are plausible reasons to have symmetry, but why asymmetry? Here we conjecture that the asymmetry is also driven by the maximization of mutual information, which, for the DMR task, means to have the CEs of different gambles as discriminable as possible. Following conventions 14, 71 and for parsimony, we had assumed a uniform Gaussian noise on the CE scale. However, larger CEs may tend to be associated with higher variances, according to Weber's law 72 . To compensate for this, more of the representational scale should be devoted to larger probabilities and thus to the larger CEs associated with them. Indeed, adopting a smaller crossover point (i.e. less than 0.5) would map larger probabilities to a longer range of subjective probabilities and effectively implement such a strategy of probability representation.
Open questions and future directions
The judgment of relative frequency and decision under risk are the only two tasks where BLO and its assumptions have been tested, but these two tasks together represent a vast body of previous research. The model may be applied to a wider range of tasks involving frequency and probability. It will likely shed light on the common and distinctive mechanisms of probability distortion in different tasks.
What determine the slope and crossover point of probability distortion in a specific task?
Why may the parameters of probability distortion change from task to task and from individual to individual? In the present study we have provided a tentative answer: they change because the brain actively compensates for its own fixed limitations.
Important questions for future research also include: How may probability distortion change from trial to trial? We conjecture that the human representation of probability can adapt to the environment, in the spirit of efficient coding 41, 42, 43 . The current version of BLO is a stationary model, whose prediction will not change with time or experience. In contrast, non-stationarity has been identified in probability distortion for both the judgment of relative frequency 24 and decision under risk 73 .
Can the BLO model apply to decisions among complex gambles with more than two non-zero outcomes? In theory, BLO just specifies the probability weighting function in Cumulative Prospect Theory 13 and can apply to any circumstances where Prospect Theory applies. But it is still an empirical question whether probability distortion for gambles with more than two non-zero outcomes can be predicted by BLO.
We chose not to test "decision from experience" 20 -another important form of decision-making-because the decision from experience task does not require that the decision maker estimate the frequency of items 19, 74 . The decision maker may estimate the multinomial distribution of rewards in a card deck-or she may simply register reward and punishment and base her decision on a form of reward averaging or reinforcement learning.
The results of the comprehensive model competition of Erev, Ert 75 are consistent with this claim. More recently, there has been neuroimaging evidence that human decisions from experience may be based on the retrieval of individual samples from past experience 76, 77 . If the decision maker does not estimate relative frequency then BLO does not apply.
A final note: Kahneman and Tversky's original Prospect Theory contained the assumption that decision makers would first interpret ("edit") available information 12 . In this initial editing stage they might, for example, convert the probability 0.31317 to the more tractable 1/3. Only then would they assign prospect values to lotteries in the second, The stimuli and procedures of the JRF task followed Zhang and Maloney (2012) . On each trial ( Figure S1b ), participants were presented with an array of black and white dots and reported their estimate of the relative-frequency of black or white dots by clicking on a horizontal bar with tick marks from 0 to 100%. Each participant was randomly assigned to report the relative frequency either for the black or for the white dots. The objective relative frequency of JRF was chosen from the same 11 possible values as its counterpart in DMR.
The total number of dots (numerosity) in a trial was varied across trials, which could be 200, Similar patterns of probability distortions (Figure 2bc , first 51 panels for Experiment JDA and last 24 panels for Experiment JDB) and results of model comparisons ( Figure S3 ) were found for participants in the two sub-experiments. Thus we collapsed the two sub-experiments in our analysis whenever applicable.
The relationship between BLO and LLO
We compare LLO (Eq. 2) to BLO rewritten:
Over the range truncated log-odds coincides with log-odds: .
Comparing the equations above, over the range replaces and replaces . In LLO, both and are fixed but in BLO, however, the reliability parameter may vary with the value of depending on the model of variance appropriate to a given task. If a specific dataset is generated by BLO but fitted by LLO, we would expect that the estimates of and would change with experimental conditions as predicted by BLO. Consequently, we can fit LLO to data and look for the pattern of deviations in the fitted coefficients predicted by BLO, a test of the BLO Model (e.g. Figure 6 ).
Applying BLO to JRF
We need additional assumptions when applying BLO to the JRF experiments. One of the key assumptions of BLO is variance compensation and, to apply BLO, we need to specify a model of the participant's sampling process and the variance of the resulting estimates. First, we assume that humans may not have access to all the tokens presented briefly in a display or in a sequence, due to perceptual and cognitive limits 78, 79 . Instead, they take samples from the population and are thus subject to the randomness associated with sampling. Within BLO, probability distortion arises in part from a compensation for the sampling noise captured in our model by the reliability parameter .
Denote the total number of dots in a display as and the relative frequency of black dots as . Suppose a sample of dots is randomly drawn from the display. We assume that the sampling is without replacement. That is, the same dot will not be drawn twice during one sampling, which is reasonable in our case. As a result, the variance of requires a correction for finite population 80 (see Supplement S2 for the derivation):
The finite population correction is intuitive: the larger the sample size relative to the population, the smaller the variance. When , i.e. when the whole population is included in the sample, we should have for each sample and thus . At the other extreme, when , sampling without replacement is equivalent to sampling with replacement, the familiar . The BLO variance correction is a weighted mixture of an estimate based on the sample and an "anchor" which may also be stochastic, with its own variance . The optimal weight for combining the two is .
Denote , the anchor precision parameter. This equation can be rewritten as .
Finally, we assume that encoded values are perturbed by additive Gaussian error (Thurstone, 1927) , updating Eq. 5 to ,
where is Gaussian error on the log-odds scale with mean 0 and variance .
Applying BLO to DMR
To model , BLO's assumptions for different tasks are the same, except that encoding variance is task-specific. Probability is described explicitly in DMR and there need be no uncertainty about its value. Participants' choices suggested, however, that they were
probability. Gaussian encoding noise on the log-odds scale, when transformed back to the probability scale, results in variance that is approximately proportional to (see Supplement S1 for proof). The reliability parameter in Eq. 5 is thus:
where is a free parameter. This same equation can be reached if, alternatively, we assume that participants were compensating for a virtual sampling process (the term in Eq.
8 can be assimilated into for constant and ). Compensation for virtual sampling was also assumed in some previous theories on probability distortion 64, 81 .
Any lottery in GW99 or Experiment JD can be written as , which offers the value x1 with probability p and otherwise x2, with . For each participant, we modeled the certainty equivalent (CE) of each lottery using Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) 13 and assumed a Gaussian error term on the CE scale, as in Gonzalez and Wu 14 :
where denotes the utility function, denotes the inverse of , denotes the probability distortion function, and is a Gaussian random variable with mean 0 and variance . The utility function for non-negative gains alone (none of the lotteries involved losses) was assumed to be a power function with parameter :
Non-parametric estimation of probability distortion
A non-parametric estimation of probability distortion is plotted in Figure 2 for each participant and each task. For JRF, where participants explicitly estimated their subjective relative frequency, the non-parametric estimation for a specific was simply the participant's mean estimate across trials, averaged on the log-odds scale:
where denotes the participant's estimate of relative frequency on trial t, .
For the of DMR, we modeled participants' CE in the framework of CPT as we did for BLO and LLO fits (Eq. 13) except that no functional form was assumed for the probability distortion function. Instead, the for each of the 11 p's was fitted as a free parameter. The same power functional form was assumed for the utility function in the nonparametric estimation as in the model fits to minimize possible differences irrelevant to probability distortion. This procedure was different from the non-parametric method of Gonzalez and Wu 14 , where no functional forms were assumed for either probability distortion or utility. We verified in the GW99 dataset that our non-parametric estimation of probability distortion led to similar results as Gonzalez and Wu 14 ( Figure S2 ).
Factorial model comparisons
We used factorial model comparison 37 to separately test the assumptions of BLO, comparing alternative models that differ in the following three "dimensions". ( ) (16) with and as free parameters. LLO and the Prelec families both are among the probability weighting functions that typically fit best to data 82, 83 . They are difficult to distinguish empirically 15, 82 .
Taking logarithms and negating twice on both sides of Prelec's function, we can see that Prelec's function is equivalent to a linear transformation (17) on the Prelec scale .
The functional form of the linear scale is based on the neo-additive family 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 which refers to a linear transformation of probability except that it may have discontinuities at the extremes to ensure is within [0,1]:
where and are free parameters. The linear scale is accordingly defined as .
For models that use the Prelec scale, we simply replaced the log-odds and its reverse transformation with and its reverse. For models that use the linear scale, the log-odds transformation was replaced by but there was no inverse transformation, because is not invertible, and no need for an inverse where probabilities outside specific boundaries are truncated to the boundaries. We considered alternative models that are bounds-free. Bounds-free models would not include the bounds parameters, and .
D3: variance compensation. In BLO, is inversely related to (Eq. 10) so that the encoding variance is appropriately compensated in the framework of Bayesian inference. Alternatively, we considered as a constant that does not change with , as if the compensated variance is constant. When is constant, the potentially nonlinear transformation of BLO (Eq. 5) is reduced to the linear transformation of LLO, as a re-parameterization would reveal (with one free parameter reduced). The two forms of variance compensation will be referred to as and .
The three dimensions-D1, D2, and D3-correspond to the three assumptions of BLO.
We did not list the presence or absence of the scaling factor as a possible dimension for both theoretical and practical reasons. On one hand, is required to map the bounded interval to the fixed Thurstone scale. On the other hand, the absence of scaling would preclude a greater-than-one . There is evidence from several laboratories other than our own experiments that can be greater than 1 16, 84, 85, 86 .
The three dimensions are independent of each other, analogous to the different factors manipulated in an experiment with a factorial design. In total, we tested 3 (D1: log-odds,
Prelec, linear) × 2 (D2: bounded, bounds-free) × 2 (D3: , ) = 12 different models. LLO is among the 12 models (when D1=log-odds, D2=bounds-free, D3=
).
Computation of mutual information
For a specific real or virtual participant in a specific task, we used the BLO model to generate simulated responses for the stimuli of the experiment and then computed the expected mutual information between the stimuli and responses using a Monte Carlo method. When and were varied, the value of was determined by the invariance . To obtain a stable estimate of the expected mutual information, we repeated the stimulus set of each task to produce 198,000 trials for JRF and 3,300,000 trials for DMR. The and in Eq. 6 refer to objective and subjective relative frequencies in JRF and refer to expected values and certainty equivalents in DMR. In the numerical computation of mutual information, continuous variables need to be quantized. For JRF, the objective and subjective probabilities were quantized by rounding to the 2 nd decimal, and for DMR, the expected values and certainty equivalents were quantized by rounding to the closest integer.
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